Correlated rationalizability: a conceptually preferable alternative to Nash equilibrium
Speaker: Ed Green, Penn State University
Abstract: Nash equilibrium incorporates the assumption that players *correctly* assess one another's strategies. In many situations, this assumption is difficult to justify. When the requirement of correctness is dropped, a family of solution concepts known as "rationalizability" characterize the intuitive idea that players are Bayesian-rational agents interacting in an environment, and that it is common knowledge among them that they are all rational. One of these concepts, correlated rationalizability, will be defined, and it will be related to an equilibrium concept that generalizes Nash equilibrium. A. Brandenburger and E. Dekel ("Rationalizability and correlated equilibria", Econometrica, 1987) is a reference for some of this material.
Room Reservation Information
Room Number: 106 McAllister
Time: 2:30pm - 3:30pm