Solutions of an epidemic game with linear social distancing cost
Speaker: Tim Reluga, Penn State Mathematics,
Abstract: Epidemics can put peopleÊ¼s health at risk, and people often change their behaviors during epidemics to increase their social distance from others and thus to reduce their risk of infection. Since behavior changes can be costly, we would like to know the optimal social distancing behavior. But the benefits of changes in behavior depend on the course of the epidemic, which itself depends on peopleÊ¼s behaviors. Differential population game theory provides one approach resolving this interdependence. I'll present an analysis of a special case of the differential SIR epidemic population game with social distancing when the relative infection rate is linear, with a zero lower bound. Complete closed-form results are obtained in the infinite-horizon case, followed by some discussion of the finite-time case and other generalizations.
Room Reservation Information
Room Number: 106 McAllister
Time: 1:00pm - 2:00pm