Solutions of an epidemic game with linear social distancing cost

Special Event

Meeting Details

For more information about this meeting, contact Stephanie Zerby, Christopher Byrne.

Speaker: Tim Reluga, Penn State Mathematics,

Abstract: Epidemics can put peopleʼs health at risk, and people often change their behaviors during epidemics to increase their social distance from others and thus to reduce their risk of infection. Since behavior changes can be costly, we would like to know the optimal social distancing behavior. But the benefits of changes in behavior depend on the course of the epidemic, which itself depends on peopleʼs behaviors. Differential population game theory provides one approach resolving this interdependence. I'll present an analysis of a special case of the differential SIR epidemic population game with social distancing when the relative infection rate is linear, with a zero lower bound. Complete closed-form results are obtained in the infinite-horizon case, followed by some discussion of the finite-time case and other generalizations.


Room Reservation Information

Room Number: 106 McAllister

Date: 10/11/2012

Time: 1:00pm - 2:00pm